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1 Introduction
Innovation studies have extensively examined the drivers and sources of innovation, 
paying particular  attention  to the technological  and organizational  capabilities that 
firms need to develop to become successful innovators (e.g. Schumpeter, 1950; Dosi, 
Nelson  and  Winter,  2002;  von  Hippel,  1994).  This  literature,  however,  has  been 
comparatively less systematic in examining the factors that block innovation or cause 
innovation failures.1 Redressing this unbalance is crucial for at least two reasons. On 
the one hand, from an innovation policy perspective, it is important to identify the 
entry  barriers  faced by potentially innovative firms,  in  order to foster  innovation-
based competition dynamics and attenuate systemic failures to innovation (Woolthuis, 
2005; Chaminade et al., 2009). On the other hand, from an innovation management 
perspective, it is important to identify the obstacles most commonly faced by firms 
along their  innovative  activities,  in  order  to  enhance  the  economic  pay-offs  from 
innovation-related efforts (Dougherty, 1992; Ferriani et al., 2008).
This papers aims at improving our understanding of the factors attenuating obstacles 
to  innovation  by  distinguishing  between  firms  that  face  deterring barriers  to 
innovation  and  firms  that  confront  revealed barriers  to  innovation  (D’Este  et  al., 
2008). As discussed throughout the paper, making this distinction between  revealed 
and  deterring is crucial  to help disentangling two essentially different mechanisms 
when referring to ‘obstacles to innovation’. 
This research draws on four successive waves of the Spanish Innovation Survey (i.e.  
years  2004,  2005,  2006  and  2007)  to  construct  a  longitudinal  dataset  on  firms’ 
innovation profiles. In order to avoid a sample selection bias problem, we consider 
only firms that are willing to participate in the innovation contest (i.e. we filter out  
firms that are not interested in undertaking innovation activities (see Savignac, 2008, 
for a similar method). We distinguish two groups of firms: one confronting deterring 
barriers  and  another  one  confronting  revealed  barriers  (using  a  propensity  score 
matching procedure). We finally examine whether firm characteristics contribute to 
attenuate the barriers experienced by firms, for each of the two groups separately. 
† Corresponding author. INGENIO (CSIC-UPV), Universidad Politécnica de Valencia. E-mail: 
pabdescu@upvnet.upv.es
‡ Corresponding author. Department of Economics, University of Trento, via Inama 5, 38100 Trento, 
Italy. E-mail: francesco.rentocchini@economia.unitn.it
1 Though there has been an increasing attention to this topic in recent years: e.g. Baldwin and Lin, 
2002; Galia and Legros, 2004; Tourigny and Le, 2004; Tiwari et al., 2007; Savignac, 2008; Iammarino 
et al., 2009; among others.
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the background discussion for 
the study and put forward a number of hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data sources 
and the method. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Barriers to innovation: background discussion  
Innovation  has  long  been  recognised  as  a  vital  contributor  to  firm  economic 
performance and survival. Both the scientific literature and the policy agenda have 
consistently highlighted the importance of investment in innovative activities to reach 
further  economic  competitiveness  and  secure  economic  growth  and  higher  living 
standards. Firms have extensively internalised this argument, with corporate strategies 
increasingly geared around innovation. 
However, despite the ample support to the discourse in favour of innovation, many 
firms  remain  persistently  detached  from  any  deliberate  effort  towards  innovation 
activities, and even further removed from any significant innovation achievement. For 
instance, drawing upon the Spanish Innovation Survey 2007, for the whole sample of 
potentially innovative2 firms, 30%3 did not conduct any innovation related activity in 
2007. This phenomenon was not exclusive of firms in low-tech industries;  among 
firms in high and medium technology manufacturing industries,  about  16% of the 
potentially innovative firms did not invest any money in innovation-related activities. 
For knowledge intensive business services (KIBS), the corresponding percentage was 
20%.
This  is  striking since  our  definition of innovation-related activities  is  quite  broad, 
encompassing  expenditures  in  tasks  that  range  from  “activities  for  the  market 
preparation and introduction of new (or significantly improved) goods and services”, 
“acquisition of machinery or equipment to produce new (or significantly improved) 
goods  or  services”  and  “internal  or  external  training  of  personnel  involved  in 
development  or  introduction  of  innovations”.  The  set  of  activities  includes  also 
expenditures in formal R&D, but it clearly expands well-beyond this category. 
If a substantial portion of the potentially innovative firms do not invest in innovation-
related activities, it is plausible to claim that the innovation system is suffering from 
systemic  failures  to  innovation.  Following  Chaminade  and  Edquist  (2006)  and 
Chaminade  et  al.  (2008),  we  define  systemic  failures  to  innovation  as  factors 
weakening the capabilities of firms to engage in interactive learning and innovation, 
and therefore, hampering innovation at a system level. Systemic failures to innovation 
include: a) the lack of private institutional support for innovation, as for instance the 
restricted  availability  of  finance  for  activities  that  entail  high  levels  of  risk  and 
uncertainty; b) the lack of information on technological and market opportunities for 
innovation,  as  a  consequence,  for  instance,  of  a  weak  connectivity  between 
organizations  in  the  innovation  system;  c)  the  lack  of  an  adequate  scientific  and 
research infrastructure, as for instance,  the weakness in the supply of an adequate 
skill-base from secondary and tertiary education; and d) the characteristics associated 
with the market structure and the potential  entry barriers from incumbents;  among 
2 In here, we follow Savignac (2008) and D’Este et al. (2008) by filtering out those 
firms that are not in the innovation contest – those that are not oriented or willing to  
innovate. We explain this in more detail in Section 3.2 below.
3 More specifically: 3113 firms out of 10316. 
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other factors.
One first indication of the extent to which barriers to innovation are prevalent among 
firms in a particular system, is provided by the proportion of firms that assess that 
certain factors have been ‘highly important’ in hampering their innovation activities 
or shaping their decision of not engaging in innovative activities. As Table 1 (column 
1)  shows (based on the Spanish Innovation Survey 2007),  factors associated  with 
availability of finance are deemed as the most important barriers for firms (about 30% 
of firms reporting that these barriers have been very important), followed by market 
related barriers (about 20%) and knowledge related barriers (about 10%).
However, the figures in column 1 mask an important feature of the impact of barriers  
on innovation. Among potentially innovative firms, those that have not engaged in 
innovation activities at all are more likely to exhibit higher barriers to innovation, 
compared to those firms that engage in innovative activities.  As columns 2 and 3 
show, these differences in the assessment of barriers apply to almost all barrier-items 
with the exception of two finance-related barrier items (i.e. ‘lack of available internal 
finance’,  for which there are no significant  differences between the two groups of 
firms, and ‘lack of available finance from other organisations’, for which differences 
run in the opposite direction). 
Table 1: Proportion of firms assessing barriers as "highly important"
Barrier items Total 
sample (n 
= 10316)
Firms not 
investing in 
innovation 
activities 
(n=3113)
Firms investing 
in innovation 
activities 
(n=7203)
Cost barriers:
   Direct innovation costs too high * 34.3 35.4 33.8
   Lack of available internal finance 30.7 30.2 31.0
   Lack  of  available  finance  from  other 
organisations ***
28.6 25.4 29.9
Market barriers:
   Market dominated by established firms ** 20.3 21.7 19.7
   Uncertain  demand  for  innovative  goods  or 
services ***
21.4 23.3 20.5
Knowledge barriers:
   Lack of qualified personnel *** 13.4 15.6 12.5
   Lack of information on technology *** 8.2 10.0 7.5
   Lack of information on markets * 8.5 9.2 8.1
   Difficulties  to  find  appropriate  innovation 
partners ***
12.3 13.9 11.6
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01, Chi-square tests for the null hypothesis that assessment of 
barriers (as important) is independent of whether the firm has invested in innovation-related activities 
or not. 
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Table 1 provides some preliminary evidence showing that firms that have not engaged 
in  innovation-related  activities  are  particularly  sensitive  to  barriers.  Or,  in  other 
words,  the  figures  in  Table  1  indicate  that  we  should  differentiate  two  different 
mechanisms of barriers on innovation activities: those barriers that deter firms from 
engaging in innovative  activities,  and those barriers that  are  faced by firms while 
engaging in innovative activities. Since the group of firms facing deterring barriers is 
willing to innovate but is prevented from entering in the innovation contest, it is in 
this  case that the systemic failures to innovation can be felt  more acutely, and are 
more likely to impose a higher social cost in terms of weaker competition intensity 
and lower innovation achievements.
2.1 Deterring versus revealed barriers to innovation
In this section we argue that it is important to distinguish two mechanisms through 
which barriers to innovation operate. On the one hand, barriers operate by deterring 
firms from engaging in innovation activities. This happens when firms that would be 
willing to undertake innovative projects, choose not to become active in innovation-
related activities. This decision is likely to be the result of the firm lacking access to 
finance for high-risk projects, lacking adequate channels to obtain information about 
markets  or  technologies,  facing  obstacles  for  the  recruitment  of  high-skilled 
employees,  or  having  difficulties  in  meeting  adequate  partners  for  innovation 
activities,  among other  reasons.  In  short,  deterring  barriers  refer  to  obstacles  that 
prevent  or  block  firms  from  undertaking  innovative  activities.  Baldwin  and  Lin 
(2002), for instance, examine this type of barriers when investigating the importance 
of impediments faced by firms with regards to the adoption of advanced technologies.
On the  other  hand,  barriers  operate  by  obstructing  the  activities  of  firms  that  do 
engage  in  innovation  projects.  These  barriers  may  simply  delay  or  slow  down 
innovation projects,  or  they may represent  a  major  determinant  of the decision to 
abandon an innovation project. Nevertheless, in these cases barriers do not prevent 
firms from initiating an innovation-activity, but may impose a substantial obstacle to 
its  completion.  For this  reason we categorize these barriers as “revealed” barriers, 
since these barriers are only observed once firms engage in innovation activities. In 
other  words,  revealed barriers  refer to obstacles  to innovation that  are realised by 
firms  alongside  their  innovation-related  activities. This  is  the  type  of  barriers 
addressed  in  the  literature  when  looking  at  financing  and  the  costs  involved  in 
bringing an innovation to market (e.g. Baldwin and Hanel, 2003). 
It is also important to make a distinction between these two types of barriers from the  
point  of  view of  innovation  policy.  If  policy  makers  aim  at  addressing  systemic 
failures in the innovation system, it is crucial to identify the extent of the problem 
(that  is,  the  proportion  of  potential  innovators  that  are  detached  from innovation 
activities) as well as to identify the main features of the actors deterred from engaging 
in  innovation  activities,  in  order  to  help  design  appropriate  policies  that  confront 
systemic failures (Chaminade and Edquist, 2006). In other words, we need to gain a 
better understanding of the systemic factors that prevent firms from being innovation-
active. Preliminary evidence in this sense has been provided by Mohnen and Roller 
(2005) who show that, when it comes to turn non-innovators into innovators, a system 
approach is needed that takes into account the complementarities between obstacles.  
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2.2 Attenuating barriers to innovation
The  main  objective  of  this  study  is  to  improve  the  understanding  of  the  factors 
attenuating  obstacles  to  innovation.  We  approach  this  objective  by  distinguishing 
between  firms  that  face  deterring barriers  to  innovation  and  firms  that  confront 
revealed barriers to innovation, since the dynamics at work might differ between these 
two  groups  of  firms  with  regards  to  the  lowering  of  barriers.  Drawing  upon  the 
literature on innovation studies, we would expect the following factors to attenuate 
deterring and/or revealed barriers to innovation. 
a) Firm size
We expect that the size of the firm should have an attenuating effect on both deterring  
and revealed barriers to innovation. This is because larger firms are more likely to 
draw on an internal pool  of financial  and knowledge-related resources,  as well  as 
benefiting from scale advantages to spread the fixed costs of innovation over a larger 
volume of sales. This makes larger firms less vulnerable to entry and revealed barriers 
to innovation (e.g. Schoonhoven et al., 1990; Cohen and Klepper, 1996; Katila and 
Shane, 2005). Additionally, we would also expect that the attenuating effect of size is 
likely  to  be  stronger  for  deterring  than  for  revealed  barriers,  since  organizational 
complexity and routines can offset  the advantages associated to  size among firms 
already engaged in innovative activities (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Christensen 
and Bower, 1996). 
b) Being a start up 
There are two conflicting arguments with regards to new firms: the creativity and 
entrepreneurial dynamism associated with start ups and the liability of newness. On 
the one  hand,  we would expect  that  recently established  firms are more  likely to 
participate in innovative activities than established firms, since new firms might be 
less  constrained  by  the  risks  of  cannibalising  existing  product  portfolios  or 
destabilizing core competencies (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Henderson, 1993). 
However,  on  the  other  hand,  start  ups  are  comparatively  more  likely  to  confront 
barriers to innovation due to a lack of prior expertise, scarcity of financial resources 
or lack of complementary assets (Schoonhoven et al., 1990; Tripsas, 1997). 
c) Human capital
The availability of highly skilled employees,  and particularly of employees with a 
higher education degree, is expected to equip firms with an adaptable, responsive and 
pro-active  workforce,  softening  the  challenges  imposed  by  changes  in  market 
conditions and the emergence of disruptive technologies (e.g. Gibbons and Johnston, 
1974; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Baldwin and Lin, 2002). Building upon this, we 
would expect that firms with a higher proportion of highly skilled employees would 
be better positioned to overcome both deterring and revealed obstacles to innovation. 
In  assessing  the  impact  of  the  above factors,  it  is  important  to  control  for  some 
important  individual  and  environmental  features  that  might  affect  the  capacity  of 
firms to face barriers to innovation. On the one hand, the extent to which the firm has 
been systematically engaged in innovation-related activities in the past (or whether it 
has never been active in innovation activities before). We would expect that firms that 
have, at some previous point in time, been engaged in innovation-related activities, 
should be better positioned to face barriers to innovation (compared to firms that have 
not been involved in the past).
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On the other hand, we control for the extent to which the firm has been recipient of 
public financial support to innovation. Most countries have implemented policies to 
boost innovation, either by subsidising highly risky innovative projects or offering 
fiscal incentives to firms that plan to expend a substantial proportion of resources in 
internal innovative activities. We would expect that firms that have been recipients of 
this type of support from public programmes, are going to be better positioned to face 
entry  barriers  to  innovation.  However,  for  those  firms  that  engage  in  innovative 
activities already, being recipient of this type of governmental support may actually 
enhance the perception of revealed barriers, since such programmes may contribute to 
intensify the firms’ engagement in more complex or ambitious innovative activities 
that bring associated a heavier requirement for financial support or knowledge-related 
capabilities.
3 Data and Method
3.1 Data sources
The  data  set  used  in  this  paper  contains  firm  level  data  from  the  Spanish 
Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC). The data is collected by a joint effort of the 
Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE), the Spanish Foundation for Science and 
Technology (FECYT), and the Foundation for Technical Innovation (COTEC). PITEC 
is  organized  as  a  panel  data  set,  with  a  relatively  consistent  data  collection 
methodology  over  a  number  of  time  periods.  The  unit  of  analysis  (i.e.  each 
observation) is the single enterprise, whether part of a larger group or independent. 
The data comes from a CIS-type survey,  based on the OECD’s Oslo Manual, and 
therefore includes  information related to innovation activities comparable with the 
microdata on innovation of many other European Countries. This database is placed at 
the  disposal  of  researchers  on  the  FECYT  website  (http://sise.fecyt.es),  and  is 
available in a set of coordinated files, i.e., a file each year (2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 
and 2007). In this paper we use specifically the data from the period 2004-20074. 
PITEC  has  a  wide  sectoral  coverage  including  both  manufacturing  and  service 
sectors. 
The sample corresponding to the last collection of data is composed by 12808 firms 
with an important representation of firms with innovative activities (around 70%). In 
order to have a longitudinal dataset with a consistent number of firms in all years, we 
have excluded those which have experienced any important contingency during the 
period 2004-2007 (that is, those for which we had missing values in some of the years 
of that period). Such contingencies are generally related to problems with the access 
to  the  firm  or  confidentiality  issues  and  problems  associated  to  mergers  and 
acquisitions or changes in the industrial activity that made it impossible to trace the 
enterprise unit throughout the period. In addition we have excluded those cases where 
no information was found about economic activity and also the firms belonging to the 
primary sector (agriculture and mining). The result was a sample of 6606 firms with 
non-missing values and with data for four waves of the Spanish innovation survey. 
4 Although PITEC provides information from 2003, we do not use the data for this year because the  
sampling procedure had important limitations. For reasons of opportunity and viability, PITEC started 
with only two samples in 2003: a sample of firms with 200 or more employees and a sample of firms  
with intramural R&D expenditure. This limitation was corrected from 2004 by including a sample of 
firms with fewer than 200 employees, external R&D expenditure and no intramural R&D expenditure; 
and a representative sample of firms with fewer than 200 employees and no innovation expenditure.
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The  advantage  of  using  this  dataset  is  that  it  allows  us  to  address  econometric 
endogeneity issues by introducing lagged variables as explanatory variables. By doing 
so, we can examine, for instance, the relationship between the assessment of barriers 
and the  extent  to  which firms have  engaged in  past  innovation  activities  or  have 
received  public  support  for  innovation  in  a  previous  period.  Specifically,  in  the 
analyses presented in this paper, the variables associated to barriers to innovation are 
taken from the 2007 survey, while the explanatory variables are taken from the 2006 
or previous surveys5. 
3.2 Filtering process of ‘potential innovators’
In line with previous work (see D’Este et al., 2008; Monhen et al., 2008; Savignac, 
2008), we filter out from our sample those firms that do not aim at innovating. This is 
done in order to correct for a sample selection bias problem, which emerges from 
asking all surveyed firms (irrespective of their willingness to engage in innovative 
activities) about obstacles to innovation. 
As reported  in  many studies  (Baldwin and Lin,  2002;  Mohnen and Roller,  2005; 
Savignac, 2008), it is found a positive correlation between the experience of barriers 
to  innovation  and  the  probability  that  a  firm  innovates  or  engages  in  innovative 
activities. As Savignac (2008) points out, this counterintuitive positive relationship is 
strongly dependent  on the inclusion in the sample of firms that are  not willing to 
innovate:  those that did not engage in innovative activities at  all  and that did not 
encounter any obstacle to innovation. Indeed, firms not aiming at innovating do not 
carry out innovation activities at all and, for this  reason, are more likely to report 
obstacles to innovation as not important. The positive relationship between the extent 
of  innovation  activity  and  the  assessment  of  innovation  obstacles  is  thus  only  a 
spurious relationship. 
In order to avoid biases resulting from the inclusion of firms that are not ‘potentially 
innovative’ firms (i.e. not willing to engage in innovative activities of any sort), it is 
necessary to distinguish non-innovating firms in two main categories: (i) firms not 
willing to innovate, i.e. those that do not carry out any innovation activity and, at the 
same  time,  do  not  experience  any  barriers  to  innovation  and  (ii)  “potential 
innovators”,  i.e.  firms  either  reporting  themselves  as  innovation  active  or 
experiencing some sort of barriers to innovation. By dropping from the analysis the 
firms belonging to the first group, it is possible to correctly estimate the sign and the 
intensity  of  the  relationship  between  the  propensity  to  innovate  and  the  firm 
assessment of barriers to innovation. Indeed, by doing that, previous work finds out 
that  the  positive  correlation  between  the  two  characteristics  of  interest  actually 
becomes a negative one (Mancusi & Vezzulli, 2009 and Savignac, 2008).
In the setting of this study, we keep only those firms that are oriented to innovation in 
the period 2004-2007 (i.e. we exclude from our sample 1276 firms, about 19,3% of 
5 We have decided to restrict our analysis to these two waves of the innovation survey for two main  
reasons. First,  the information about the proportion of highly skilled employees is  available in the 
PITEC database from the 2006 survey only. Second, questionnaires corresponding to 2004 and 2005 
have undergone some changes that could affect the temporal consistency of the data; while compared 
with 2006, the questionnaire corresponding to 2007 does not show changes. In spite of this fact, when  
it has been possible, we have used some variables taken form the 2004 and 2005 survey to carry out a 
number of robustness checks.
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our longitudinal  sample).  In  order  to  identify  this  group we used the  information 
contained in the Spanish Innovation Survey. In particular,  the survey includes two 
questions asking whether the firm has been engaged in innovation activities during the 
last three years and whether it has experienced any barriers to innovation during that 
period. If the firm responds negatively to these questions, we classified the firm as 
non-innovation oriented. The underlying rationale is that firms that did not carry out 
innovation activities and did not experience any barrier to innovation are unlikely to 
have any aspiration to innovate. Indeed, about 54% of these companies also indicated 
that innovation was not necessary in their respective markets because of the lack of 
demand for innovations. After this procedure we are left with a sample containing 
5330 firms.
3.3 Measures 
In order to obtain a measure of the assessment of innovation obstacles, we have drawn 
on the responses to a question on the Spanish innovation survey on factors hampering 
innovation that asked: “During the three-year period 2005-2007, how important were 
the  following  factors  as  constraints  to  your  innovation  activities  or  influencing  a 
decision  not  to  innovate?”.  The questionnaire  distinguishes  between nine  types  of 
factors, grouped into three sets of barriers: a) cost factors; b) knowledge factors; and 
c) market factors (see Table 1 for a description of the nine barrier items). We have 
chosen not to  investigate  the nine barrier  items individually,  but  the three sets  of 
barriers mentioned above. In order to do this, we have measured the extent to which 
firms assess barriers as important in three different ways. The first one is based on the 
construction  of  a  dichotomous  variable,  indicating  whether  the  firm  assesses  as 
important at least one barrier item (i.e. the variable takes the value 1 if the firm has 
assessed as highly important at least one barrier within each set, and takes the value 0 
otherwise). The second one is a categorical ordered variable, representing the number 
of barrier items (within each barrier set) that are assessed as highly important.6 And 
the third one based on the average assessment of all items in a particular barrier set – 
a variable that is bounded between 1 (if the firm assesses all barrier items as being of 
low  importance)  and  4  (if  the  firm  assesses  all  barrier  items  as  being  highly 
important).7  
As we mentioned in Section 2.2 one of the main objectives of this study is to identify 
the  factors  that  may  influence  or  attenuate  the  assessment  of  barriers  as  highly 
important. Following this, we have constructed the following three variables. First, a 
measure of firm size is included since previous research shows that larger firms are 
less vulnerable to entry and revealed barriers to innovation. This variable is measured 
as the natural logarithm of the total number of employees in 2006 (Size).  Second, 
given  that  new firms could  behave differently  from established firms in  terms of 
assessment of barriers, a variable that states whether or not the firm is a start-up is  
included (Startup). This variable takes the value 1 if the firm has been established 
after  1  January of 2002. Third,  the proportion  of  the total  employees  with higher 
education degree is used as a proxy for the firm’s human capital level. This variable is 
taken from the 2006 survey (HumCap). 
6 Thus, for instance, in the case of ‘cost factors’ the dependent variable ranges from 0 to 3, since firms 
may assess either none, one, two or all three cost-related items as highly important.
7 In this case we distinguish between obstacles grouped in four sets of barriers: a) overall barriers  
(ObsTot); b) cost barriers (ObsCost); c) knowledge barriers (ObsKnow) and d) market barriers 
(ObsMkt).
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We have also included, as control variables, three variables related to  the extent to 
which the firm has been recipient of public financial  support to innovation.  These 
variables are taken from the 2006 survey and are dummy variables taking the value 1 
if  the  firm  indicates  that  it  received  public  support  for  European  (PubSupEur), 
National (PubSupNat) and regional/local governments (PubSupLoc) to support their 
innovative  activities  during  the  period  2004-2006.  We also  control  for  the  firm’s 
degree of engagement in innovative activities in the past. To this end, we include two 
variables: a) InnInt (innovation expenditures on total sales in 2006) and Innexp (this 
variable takes the value 1 if the firm has engaged in innovation activities during the 
period  2004-2006,  and 0 otherwise).  We also  included a variable representing the 
market orientation of the firm (IntMkt),  which is defined as a binary variable and 
takes the value 1 if the firm sells its goods or services in other countries. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
All observations (N=5330)
mean Sd min max
ObsTot 2.57 0.67 1 4
ObsCost 2.8 0.94 1 4
ObsKnow 2.32 0.8 1 4
ObsMkt 2.79 0.95 1 4
NInn8 1.63 1.4 0 7
Size 4.19 1.5 0 10.02
Startup 0.07 0.25 0 1
PubSupLoc 0.3 0.46 0 1
PubSupNat 0.23 0.42 0 1
PubSupEur 0.06 0.23 0 1
HumCap 26.44 27.42 0 100
IntMkt 0.71 0.45 0 1
InnInt 22.43 258.82 0 13701.79
InnExp 0.79 0.41 0 1
IndMHT 0.08 0.27 0 1
IndMMT 0.24 0.43 0 1
IndMLT 0.35 0.48 0 1
IndSLT 0.11 0.32 0 1
IndSHT 0.21 0.41 0 1
Finally, we have included a set of five variables to control for the effect of sectoral  
characteristics.  The  sectoral  dummies  have  been  defined  taking  into  account  the 
distinction  between  low  (IndMLT),  medium-high  (IndMMT)  and  high  (IndMHT) 
technology sectors  in  manufacturing  (as  defined  by Eurostat/OECD classification) 
and the distinction between High-tech-knowledge intensive service sector (IndSHT)
and  firms  in  other  service  sectors  (IndSLT).9 In  Table  2  we  provide  descriptive 
statistics of the variables used in this study.
8 Number of innovative activities
9 According to the Spanish classification the group of High-tech knowledge-intensive service sector 
comprised the following economic activities: a) post and telecommunications, b) computer and related 
activities, and c) research and development. 
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3.4 Examining differences in the assessment of barriers between  
matched groups of firms, using a propensity score matching  
procedure
As discussed in Section 2, our aim is to investigate how different firm characteristics 
contribute to lowering deterring and revealed barriers to innovation. To do that, we 
need to distinguish which type of firms are experiencing each type of barrier. While 
from a conceptual  point of view the distinction between the two types of barriers 
might be clear-cut (see Section 2), its operationalisation is much more difficult from 
an empirical viewpoint. 
Two main issues are at work here which we need to cope with. First, no question is 
available  in  the  Spanish  Innovation  Survey  that  allows  us  to  clearly  distinguish 
whether a firm is experiencing either deterring or revealed barriers. Second, firms can 
actually face at the same time both kinds of barriers, rather than only one of the two: 
there might be a “grey zone” where firms are neither strongly engaged in innovative 
activities  nor  completely  deterred from engaging in  innovation  activities.  For  this 
reason, it is necessary to provide a separation as clear-cut as possible between firms 
facing deterring and revealed barriers. Thus, the first step is to individuate those firms 
that face clearly either revealed barriers or deterring barriers to innovation. 
Our approach to identify differences  between the two groups of firms relies  on a 
quasi-experimental procedure by comparing outcomes for a treated10 group of firms 
and a control group. We use the propensity score matching technique to identify a 
control group without markedly differences compared to target firms, based on a set 
of observed characteristics. The procedure consists of matching firms with a similar 
(or identical) estimated probability of carrying out a “certain” number of innovative 
activities, based on a set of observable characteristics.11 Once this propensity score is 
calculated, observations from target and non-target firms are matched – each target 
firm is associated with a control firm endowed with a similar propensity score.12
10 In our case the treatment, or better the treatments, are defined as the specific numbers of innovative 
activities carried out by the firms belonging to a particular group.
11 To obtain the propensity score,  we estimate a logistic  model where the dependent variable is  a 
dummy variable taking value 1 if  a ‘selected’ number of innovative activities is carried out and 0  
otherwise.  As  explanatory  variables,  we  make  use  of  the  most  important  factors  stressed  by  the 
literature  to  explain  firms’ propensity  to  innovate:  firm  size,  firm  age,  market  power  as  well  as  
environmental characteristics (e.g. technological opportunities, demand pull, etc.).
12 Three main characteristics of propensity score matching are worth emphasizing: (i) no assumptions  
are  made on  the functional  form of  the relationship  between explanatory variables  and dependent 
variable; (ii) there must be a common support for treated and non-treated observations, that is there 
must be an overlap between the range of values taken by the relevant characteristics for the two groups 
otherwise  it  would  impossible  to  provide  a proper  comparison and  (iii)  conditional  on observable 
characteristics, the selection bias will disappear (selection on observables or conditional independence 
assumption).This last point implies that systematic differences related to unobservables may remain.  
Thus, a  key maintained assumption is that,  conditional  on the vector  of  explanatory variables,  the 
observed outcome under treatment and the potential outcome under no treatment are independent of 
assignment to treatment. Nevertheless, it might be the case that unobservables affecting the outcome 
affect assignment to the treatment group as well. In this case, the selection on observables assumption  
cannot be maintained anymore and propensity score matching is not able to consistently estimate the 
effect of treatment on the outcome variable. Unfortunately, the assumption cannot be directly tested but 
the availability of ample information is important to define a vector of explanatory variables that makes 
the assumption as plausible as possible.
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Since our aim is to examine whether firms with different levels of engagement  in 
innovation  activities  attach  a  different  importance  to  barriers,  we  define  different 
kinds of treatments according to the number of innovative activities that firms are 
carrying  out  (as  reported  in  the  Spanish  Innovation  Survey).  For  each  treatment 
definition we estimate, as mentioned above, the probability of being treated, that is the 
probability that a firm carries out a certain number of innovative activities (according 
to the definition of treatment taken into account). We then find, for each treated unit,  
one or several non-treated units that have the same (or a sufficiently close) estimated 
probability of carrying out the same number of innovative activities. 
We then compare these groups of firms in terms of the average assessment of barriers 
to innovation (our outcome variable) as reported by the firm in the survey, thus testing 
for differences in mean assessment rates of innovation barriers for treated and non-
treated units. Not only this provides an estimate of the average treatment effect on the 
treated,  but we are also able to identify a pattern in the assessment of barriers to 
innovation along the extent of innovative activities carried out. In this way, we extend 
and  generalize  the  distinction  proposed  by  D’Este  et  al.  (2008),  by  providing  an 
empirically grounded threshold based on the extent of the engagement of firms in 
innovation activities.
4 Findings
4.1 Revealed and deterring barriers to innovation: towards an operational 
distinction
By plotting the average assessment of barriers to innovation against the number of 
innovative activities (see  Figure 1), we note an interesting relationship between the 
two characteristics, i.e. a clear U-shaped pattern. In particular, it looks like that firms 
reporting a modest number of innovative activities (1 or 2) tend, on average, to report 
barriers to innovation as less important compared to other firms (those that do not 
carry out innovative activities at all and those that report a medium-high number of 
innovative activities).
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Figure 1: Curvilinear relationship between importance of barriers to innovation and number of 
innovative activities
This behaviour is consistent with our argument in favour of a differentiation between 
deterring and revealed barriers to innovation. Interestingly, the U-shaped pattern, that 
is valid for the overall assessment of barriers to innovation, seems to be driven mainly 
by knowledge and market barriers to innovation rather than cost barriers. In the latter 
case, the average assessment, although increasing for firms reporting a medium and 
high  number  of  innovative  activities,  seems  not  to  be  different  between  firms 
reporting  no  innovative activities  and those characterised  by  a  modest  number of 
them. A similar pattern can be found in Table 3, where we provide some descriptive 
statistics  for  all  the  firms  contained  in  our  sample  and  for  the  groups  of  firms 
according to the number of innovative activities.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics by groups of firms according to the number of innovative activities
All observations 
(N=5330)
Non innovators* 
(N=1300)
Modest innovators** 
(N=2810)
Moderate and strong 
innovators*** 
(N=1220)
mean sd min max mean sd min Max mean sd min max mean sd min max
ObsTot 2.57 0.67 1 4 2.59 0.7 1 4 2.55 0.67 1 4 2.62 0.62 1 4
ObsCost 2.8 0.94 1 4 2.8 0.96 1 4 2.79 0.94 1 4 2.83 0.9 1 4
ObsKnow 2.32 0.8 1 4 2.35 0.86 1 4 2.28 0.79 1 4 2.37 0.74 1 4
ObsMkt 2.79 0.95 1 4 2.82 0.96 1 4 2.74 0.96 1 4 2.85 0.9 1 4
NInn 1.63 1.4 0 7 0 0 0 0 1.47 0.5 1 2 3.71 0.9 3 7
Size 4.19 1.5 0
10.0
2 4.02 1.55 0 8.65 4.14 1.44 0 10.02 4.48 1.57 0.69 9.93
Startup 0.07 0.25 0 1 0.03 0.17 0 1 0.07 0.25 0 1 0.11 0.32 0 1
HumCap 26.44 27.42 0 100 17.29 23.75 0 100 28.02 27.7 0 100 32.56 28.02 0 100
Note: (*) “non-innovators”, firms reporting no innovative activities; (**) “modest innovators”, firms 
reporting 1 or 2 innovative activities; and (***) “moderate and strong innovators”, firms reporting 3 to 
7 innovative activities.
However, the figures presented in Table 3 and the visual representation of Figure 1, 
are simple descriptive comparisons. They show that a different behaviour ‘might’ be 
present among the firms in our sample according to the level of innovation carried out 
and that these firms are likely to face different kinds of barriers to innovation. 
We now turn  to  examine  whether  these  differences  still  hold,  once  we  explicitly 
consider all of the factors that may influence the probability of carrying out different 
levels of innovative activities. To do that, we rely on the propensity score matching 
procedure  explained  in  Section  3.4.  The  main  purpose  is  to  compare  the  rate  of 
barriers’ assessment of firms carrying out a different number of innovative activities 
with those of an appropriate control group.
We do this  by taking into consideration three treated groups: (i)  “non-innovators” 
(firms reporting no innovative activities), (ii) “modest innovators” (firms reporting 1 
or  2  innovative  activities)  and (iii)  “moderate  innovators”  (those reporting 3 or  4 
innovative activities). We compare each one of them with several control groups. For 
instance,  for  the  “non-innovators”,  we  compare  how  the  average  assessment  of 
barriers  to  innovation  differs  from  that  of  a  control  group  composed  by  firms 
reporting  more  than  one  innovative  activity  (column  1  in  Table  4);  from  that 
composed of modest  innovators (column 2 in  Table  4),  from moderate innovators 
(column 3 in Table 4), and finally from strong innovators (column 4 in Table 4).13 We 
then compare the group of “modest innovators” with a group of controls drawn from 
moderate (column 5 in  Table 4) and strong innovators (column 6 in  Table 4). And 
13 Strong innovators are defined as those firms that report a number of innovative activities between 5 
and 7.
13
finally, the last comparison is done between the group of moderate innovators and a 
control group containing strong innovators (column 7 in Table 4).
Table 4 shows the difference between the average assessment of barriers to innovation 
of  the  treated  and  control  groups  that  constitutes  the  Average  Treatment  for  the 
Treated (ATT) estimation procedure. A positive and significant difference is found 
between  non-innovators  and  modest  innovators  while  a  negative  and  significant 
difference  is  present  between  modest  innovators  and  groups  of  controls  that  are 
moderately  and  strongly  innovative  as  well  as  between  moderate  and  strong 
innovators. Interestingly, no significant difference is found between non-innovators 
and control groups containing firms carrying out more than 3 innovative activities.
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Table 4: Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) estimation of the average assessment of 
barriers to innovation
Non-
innovators vs 
innovators  †
Non-
innovators 
vs modest 
innovators†
Non-
innovators 
vs 
moderate 
innovators†
Non-
innovators 
vs strong 
innovators‡
Modest 
innovators 
vs 
moderate 
innovators†
Modest 
innovators 
vs strong 
innovators‡
Moderate 
innovators 
vs strong 
innovators‡
Overall
ATT 0.045* 0.06* -0.001 -0.084 -0.05* -0.2** -0.13**
SE 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.04
N treated 1300 1300 1300 1298 2810 2796 999
N controls 4030 2810 1002 3812 1002 2519 4283
Cost  
barriers
ATT 0.013 0.03 -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 -0.17* -0.12**
SE 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.1 0.03 0.06 0.05
N treated 1300 1300 1300 1298 2810 2796 999
N controls 4030 2810 1002 3812 1002 2519 4283
Knowledge 
barriers
ATT 0.06* 0.07** 0.009 -0.02 -0.07* -0.16** -0.11*
SE 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.05
N treated 1300 1300 1300 1298 2810 2796 999
N controls 4030 2810 1002 3812 1002 2519 4283
Market  
barriers
ATT 0.07* 0.1** 0.007 -0.16 -0.08** -0.3** -0.2**
SE 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.1 0.03 0.06 0.05
N treated 1300 1300 1300 1298 2810 2796 999
N controls 4030 2810 1002 3812 1002 2519 4283
† ATT estimation with the kernel propensity score matching with bootstrapped standard errors (100  
replications)
‡ ATT estimation with the stratification method
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01
The results  from the propensity score matching confirm the outcome obtained via 
descriptive and visual inspections. In particular, we find that a non-innovator is likely 
to rate barriers to innovation as more important compared to modest innovators, while 
a modest innovator tends to rate barriers  as less important compared to firms that are 
more strongly engaged in innovation activities, i.e. those carrying out a higher number  
of innovative activities. This confirms the U-shape pattern in the relationship between 
the number of innovative activities a firm carries out and its assessment of barriers.  
We moreover find that this overall pattern is actually driven by knowledge and market 
barriers while we do not find such a pattern for cost barriers.
In short, there are a number of implications emerging from the results shown in Table 
4.  Building upon the evidence of a  U-shaped relationship between engagement in 
innovative  activities and assessment  of  barriers  as  important,  we can  argue that  a 
particular  group of  firms (i.e.  the “non-innovators”)  are  particularly  likely to  face 
deterring barriers: that is, barriers that prevent them from starting innovation activity. 
The matching procedure helps us to conclude that, when compared with groups of 
firms  of similar  characteristics  that  engage only modestly in innovation activities, 
“non innovators” are experiencing significantly stronger barriers to innovation. 
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Moreover, there are other groups of firms (i.e. moderate and strong innovators) for 
which obstacles increase alongside their engagement in innovative activities. Thus, 
these firms are likely to be facing revealed barriers, in the sense that their awareness 
of factors hindering innovation do not prevent them from pursuing innovation-related 
activities.  In  between  the  two,  there  is  a  group  of  firms  composed  by  modest 
innovators  that  are  probably facing  a mix  of the two kinds  of  obstacles;  in  other 
words,  these  firms  are  located  in  a  blurred  grey  zone  that  makes  it  difficult  to 
unambiguously  classify  as  either  experiencing  only  deterring  barriers  or  revealed 
barriers to innovation.
We now turn our attention more directly to these two groups of firms: those facing 
deterring barriers and those facing revealed barriers. In particular, in Section 4.2 we 
examine the impact of the expected attenuating factors on the two types of obstacles 
(knowledge  and  market  barriers)  comparing  those  firms  facing  deterring  barriers 
versus those facing revealed barriers.
4.2 Factors attenuating the assessment of barriers to innovation: a 
comparison of revealed and deterring barriers
In this  section we concentrate on the empirical  test  of the hypothesis  proposed in 
Section 2 concerning individual and environmental factors that are likely to attenuate 
deterring  barriers  as  opposed  to  revealed  ones.  In  particular,  we  systematically 
compare the results for the two samples of firms: those confronting deterring barriers 
and those facing revealed barriers as they have been defined in the previous section. 
We  moreover  control  for  a  number  of  firm  and  industry  features:  e.g.  the 
internationalisation of its customer base and industrial sector dummies.
The empirical analysis is based on a logistic model that takes into consideration two 
dependent variables, differentiating between knowledge and market obstacles14. The 
dependent variables are dichotomous, indicating whether the firm assesses as highly 
important at least one barrier item.15 The estimation is conducted on two related sub-
samples. 
On the one hand, firms facing deterring barriers to innovation: that is, the group of 
firms that have not been engaged in innovation activities. Since non-innovators report 
their assessment on how important knowledge and market obstacles are, we define 
two  dependent  variables:  one  related  to  knowledge  barriers  (KNOW_DET)  and 
another one related to market barriers (MKT_DET).
On the other hand, we consider firms facing revealed barriers: that is, the group of 
firms  that  engage  in  3  or  more  innovative  activities  (the  moderate  and  strong 
innovators).  As in the  previous  case,  these  firms report  their  assessments  on both 
knowledge and market barriers, so we consider two dependent variables: one related 
14 On the grounds of the findings obtained in Section 4.1, cost barriers are not taken into account in the 
estimation of factors influencing the assessment of innovation obstacles. Indeed, in the latter case no  
clear  U-shaped relationship  is  found to hold  and,  for  this  reason,  we are not  able  to  differentiate  
between firms facing deterring barriers as opposed to those facing revealed ones.
15 We also estimated an ordered logistic regression by considering as dependent variable the number of 
barrier items assessed as highly important by the firm. Results do not differ significantly from the ones 
provided here for the logistic model and are reported in the appendix.
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to knowledge obstacles (KNOW_REV) and another one related to market obstacles 
(MKT_REV). The results are reported in Table 5.
Results  from Table 5 show a negative and significant  coefficient for firm size.  In 
particular, other things being equal, being a larger firm decreases the probability of 
assessing barriers to innovation as highly important irrespective of facing revealed or 
deterring obstacles. It is worth stressing that this result is similar for knowledge and 
market barriers. However, contrary to the hypothesis proposed in Section 2, being a 
new firm does not seem to influence the probability of assessing barriers as important, 
with no notable difference between the group of firms facing deterring barriers and 
those confronting revealed ones.
Interestingly, human capital (i.e. the proportion of employees with a higher education 
degree) is  found to be significant  and negatively related to the assessment  of the 
importance of barriers to innovation. In particular, this result is found to hold for those  
firms confronting deterring barriers to innovation (either knowledge or market related 
ones), but it is not found for firms confronting revealed barriers. This latter result is 
quite important because it clearly shows that firms with a higher proportion of highly 
skilled employees are better positioned to overcome deterring obstacles to innovation 
in particular. 
Sectoral  affiliation  also  has  some bearing  on  the  firms’ assessment  of  barriers  to 
innovation, as shown by the fact that some of them turn out to be significant. More 
specifically,  firms  in  low or  medium-tech  manufacturing  industries  exhibit  higher 
knowledge revealed barriers. On the contrary, firms in high-tech service industries 
exhibit lower levels of revealed market barriers.
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Table 5: Results of the logistic model
Dependent variable: whether the firm assesses at least 1 barrier 
as highly important
KNOW_DET KNOW_REV MKT_DET MKT_REV
Size -0.18399*** -0.32894*** -0.25744*** -0.16117***
(0.050) (0.060) (0.045) (0.048)
StartUp -0.21400 -0.62926 0.45278 0.48756
(0.453) (0.397) (0.389) (0.331)
HumCap -0.00998** 0.00414 -0.00568* 0.00177
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
PubSupNat 0.19086 0.34571* 0.32212 -0.01581
(0.293) (0.175) (0.270) (0.153)
PubSupEur 0.74755 0.44347 -0.74038 0.21069
(0.635) (0.244) (0.704) (0.226)
PubSupLoc 0.53279* 0.15299 -0.04513 -0.12153
(0.214) (0.167) (0.204) (0.146)
IntMkt -0.18678 -0.05964 0.05924 0.29220
(0.141) (0.206) (0.128) (0.186)
InnInt -0.00090 -0.00017 0.00007 0.00024
(0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
InnExp -0.15277 -0.01583 0.14828 -0.52912
(0.187) (0.542) (0.165) (0.437)
IndMLT -0.46989 0.67690* -0.53496 -0.05865
(0.381) (0.277) (0.344) (0.224)
IndMMT -0.11311 0.56610* -0.27116 -0.05402
(0.353) (0.279) (0.322) (0.223)
IndSLT -0.04987 0.24119 0.16120 0.26940
(0.425) (0.316) (0.384) (0.264)
IndSHT -0.08046 0.03288 -0.53547 -0.63904*
(0.373) (0.318) (0.340) (0.265)
Cons -0.01839 -0.73345 0.86252* 0.09186
(0.389) (0.583) (0.358) (0.478)
Chi2 39.84621 76.34295 72.59815 57.02215
N 1300 1220 1300 1220
Log-likelihood -704 -603 -817 -745
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Building  upon  the  results  in  Table  5,  we  provide  a  visual  representation  of  the 
negative  impact  of  “human  capital”  on  the  estimated  probabilities  of  assessing 
deterring  barriers  as  highly  important  (with  all  other  variables  measured  at  their 
means), differentiating between knowledge (Figure 2) and market barriers (Figure 3). 
The  figures  show  that  having  a  larger  share  of  skilled  employees  attenuates  the 
deterring effect of knowledge and market obstacles to innovation.   
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Figure 2: Impact of human capital on the assessment of knowledge obstacles to innovation
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Figure 3: The impact of human capital on the assessment of market obstacles to innovation
5 Discussion and conclusions
Despite  the fact  that  innovation  is  often seen to  be the  key to a  firm’s  economic 
success, not all firms willing to innovate engage in innovation activities. As this paper 
shows,  about  30% of  our  sample  of  “potential  innovators”  do not  engage in  any 
innovative activity, and another 50% engage only modestly (i.e. in two innovation-
related activities at most). This raises the issue about why firms are deterred from 
innovation and what factors may attenuate the obstacles faced by firms to engage in 
innovation activities. These are the main questions addressed in this paper. 
The paper contribution is threefold. First, the paper shows that there is a U-shaped 
relationship  between  the  level  of  engagement  in  innovative  activities  and  the 
assessment of barriers. This is important since it confirms that, indeed, non-innovators 
are  extremely  sensitive  to  barriers  to  innovation:  they  actually  assess  barriers  as 
significantly more important compared to firms involved modestly in innovation, and 
their  assessments  are  similar  to  firms  involved  strongly  in  innovation  related 
activities.
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This curvilinear relationship highlights, first, that there are actually different groups of 
firms  that  perceive  high  “levels”  of  barriers  to  innovation;  and  second,  that  the 
barriers experienced by each group are of a different kind. While firms in one group 
(i.e. those firms not engaged in innovative activities) are likely to face obstacles that 
deter them from engaging in innovation activities, firms in the other group (i.e. those 
strongly involved in innovative activities) are likely to face obstacles that are revealed 
alongside their engagement in innovation-related activities. Our results here support 
previous findings for the UK (see D’Este et al., 2008) and provide a line of response 
to the counter intuitive finding in much of the literature on obstacles to innovation 
based  on  innovation  surveys  that  shows  a  positive  and  significant  impact  of 
constraints on the likelihood to have innovative activities (Baldwin and Lin, 2002; 
Mohnen and Roller, 2005; Savignac, 2008). 
Second, the paper shows that market and knowledge barriers are playing a much more 
important  role  than cost-barriers  as  deterring  mechanisms to innovation  activities. 
Financial constrains have often been the focus of most of the empirical literature on 
obstacles  to  innovation.  Moreover,  as  confirmed  in  this  study,  financial-related 
barriers  are  often  the  most  prevalent  among  survey  respondents.  However,  our 
findings show that cost-related barriers are particularly strong among firms heavily 
engaged in  innovation  activities.  In  other  words,  firms  seem to be  more  strongly 
deterred from innovation by factors such as market conditions (i.e. ‘market dominated 
by established firms’ or ‘uncertain demand for innovative products’) and knowledge 
(i.e. ‘lack of qualified personnel’ or ‘lack of information on technology’),  than by 
financial-related obstacles. 
Without doubt, it would be important to replicate this study in different settings in 
order to check for the robustness of the findings. Nevertheless, these findings provide 
preliminary evidence that points towards policy measures to promote innovation that 
expand well-beyond the availability of finance and the response to imperfect financial 
markets.  Instead,  they  point  towards  policies  addressing  systemic  failures  on 
innovation associated with the weaknesses of the research infrastructure, the lack of 
technological capabilities among firms, and the entry barriers emerging from highly 
concentrated markets (among others).    
Third, this research has also addressed the extent to which certain firm characteristics 
alleviate deterring and revealed obstacles to innovation. In this respect, our findings 
indicate the following.  Small  firms seem to be clearly disadvantaged to face both 
deterring and revealed barriers on innovation. As expected, large firms seem to benefit  
from economies  of  scale  and  scope  that  attenuate  the  importance  of  obstacles  to 
innovation. In this sense, policy initiatives oriented to support risky projects by small 
firms should be welcomed. 
However,  we  have  not  found  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  start-up  firms  are 
particularly  sensitive  to  deterring  barriers  on  innovation.  Rather,  being  a  new-
established firm does not seem to imply either an advantage or a disadvantage to face 
deterring  or  revealed  barriers.  Additionally,  our  results  do  not  support  either  that 
deterring barriers are particularly prevalent among firms in high-tech sectors. One of 
the future avenues of this research is to investigate whether there is any interaction 
effect between these to features (i.e. start-ups and high-tech industries), with regards 
to the assessment of barriers.       
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Finally, our findings point out that firms with a highly educated workforce are better 
equipped to face deterring barriers on innovation, with regards to both knowledge and 
market barriers. This result points out the importance of a science and technology 
infrastructure (and of universities in particular) as suppliers of a talented workforce in 
order to avoid a shortage of skills  available on the market; but also highlights the 
importance  of  raising  awareness  among  firms  about  the  need  to  introduce  the 
organisational changes required to continuously upgrading their skill-base.  
This  study  has  a  number  of  limitations.  On  the  one  hand,  our  sample  of  non-
innovators  is  likely  to  be  underrepresented  (this  type  of  surveys  tend to  have  an 
overrepresentation of firms that carry out innovative activities), and therefore we need 
to  be  cautious  about  making  inferences  to  the  whole  population  of  firms,  and 
particularly to “potential innovators” that do not carry out innovation activities. On 
the other hand, we have not introduced explicitly (besides industry controls) the role 
of environmental factors in shaping the assessment of firms about barriers. We plan to 
address this latter issue more explicitly in future work. 
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Appendix
Ordered logistic regression
Dependent variable: number of barrier items assessed as highly important
KNOW_DET KNOW_REV MKT_DET MKT_REV
Size -0.34987*** -0.29422*** -0.24023*** -0.15127**
(0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.047)
StartUp 0.12833 0.69683* 0.39678 0.49017
(0.336) (0.291) (0.359) (0.308)
PubSupLoc 0.13567 -0.09264 -0.07723 -0.08109
(0.181) (0.129) (0.198) (0.142)
PubSupNat -0.23961 0.16471 0.45256 -0.03844
(0.248) (0.134) (0.261) (0.150)
PubSupEur 0.43480 0.35481 -0.73055 0.23790
(0.542) (0.196) (0.696) (0.220)
HumCap -0.00600* -0.00346 -0.00645* 0.00065
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
IntMkt 0.15968 0.12740 0.03959 0.25281
(0.114) (0.158) (0.124) (0.182)
InnInt -0.00330 0.00046 -0.00001 0.00012
(0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
InnExp -0.02134 -0.36358 0.12943 -0.59984
(0.148) (0.384) (0.159) (0.426)
IndMLT 0.08852 -0.46641* -0.77040* -0.07059
(0.304) (0.199) (0.334) (0.218)
IndMMT -0.04534 -0.41969* -0.50536 -0.06423
(0.287) (0.196) (0.312) (0.217)
IndSLT 0.45259 -0.17273 0.00162 0.26755
(0.342) (0.238) (0.370) (0.255)
IndSHT -0.20640 -0.41409 -0.74699* -0.59026*
(0.303) (0.224) (0.331) (0.260)
cut1
_cons -1.47301*** -1.48949*** -1.03669** -0.10963
(0.324) (0.424) (0.347) (0.468)
cut2
_cons -0.53561 -0.57649 0.41963 1.44980**
(0.321) (0.422) (0.348) (0.472)
cut3
_cons 0.29924 0.36879
(0.323) (0.424)
Chi-square 126.55685 109.78045 75.24658 52.60688
N 1300 1220 1300 1220
Log-likelihood -1550 -1430 -1120 -991
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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